### 2NC

#### Capitalism reduces everything to market abstractions—negates value to life and justifies the extermination of devalued people

Kovel 2 Professor of Social Studies at Bard, 02 (Joel, “The Enemy of Nature,” p140-141)

The precondition of an ecologically rational attitude toward nature is the recognition that nature far surpasses us and has its own intrinsic value, irreducible to our practice. Thus we achieve differentiation from nature. It is in this light that we would approach the question of transforming practice ecologically — or, as we now recognize to be the same thing, dialectically. The monster that now bestrides the world was born of the conjugation of value and dominated labour. From the former arose the quantification of reality, and, with this, the loss of the differentiated recognition essential for ecosystemic integrity; from the latter emerged a kind of selfhood that could swim in these icy waters. From this standpoint one might call capitalism a ‘regime of the ego’, meaning that under its auspices a kind of estranged self emerges as the mode of capital’s reproduction. This self is not merely prideful the ordinary connotation of ‘egotistical’ — more fully, it is the ensemble of those relations that embody the domination of nature from one side, and, from the other, ensure the reproduction of capital. This ego is the latest version of the purified male principle, emerging aeons after the initial gendered domination became absorbed and rationalized as profit­ability and self-maximization (allowing suitable ‘power-women’ to join the dance). It is a pure culture of splitting and non-recognition: of itself, of the otherness of nature and of the nature of others. In terms of the preceding discussion, it is the elevation of the merely individual and isolated mind-as-ego into a reigning principle. ‘~ Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way. The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally. When the Nazis killed their victims, the crimes were accom­panied

#### Ethics DA – we have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Heidegger’s philosophy divorces us from the praxis of social Being which alone can achieve meaning and change – he fails to acknowledge the historicality of existence and encourages a blinding focus on the self as the source of onotology

Lukacs 80 (Georg, “The Destruction of Reason”, http://maximumred.blogspot.com/2010\_06\_01\_archive.html)

In view of this interpretation of time Heidegger's second chief programmatic point, proof of the elementary historicality of 'existence' as a basis for comprehending history, turns out to be pure shadow-boxing. Heidegger was right in making a stand against the neo-Kantians who were trying to argue historicality from a 'subjective' setting, and in indicating that Being must be historical in order for there to be any historical science. As on many points, vitalism was here preempting the collapse of undialectical idealism. Butg Heidegger still lagged far behind the neo-Kantians in the concrete definition of his 'existential' historicity. As a consequence the primary phenonmena of history was, for him, existence, i.e., the life of the individual, the 'universal coherence of life between birth and death'. And this too - quite in accordance with the Diltheyan vitalistic method - was defind from experience: 'It (this coherence, G.L.) consists of a sequence of experiences "within time"'. The result was a double distortion. Firstly, Heidegger did not take the historical data in Nature as the 'originals' (Kant-Laplace theory, Darwinism, etc.), but presented the coherence of human experiences far removed from the 'original state' as the starting-point, the 'primal phenomenon'. Secondly, he failed to observe that his 'primal phenomenon' was derivative: a consequence of that social Being and praxis of men in which alone such a 'coherence' of experiences could come about at all. As far as he did notice a link, he rejected it as belonging to the domain of the 'one'. In so doing, he not only isolated a distorted derivate of human social praxis - as an historical 'primal phenonmenon', as 'original' - from real history, but also set them up as antinomies. The tendency to falsify in this way the structure of reality graphically expresses the pre-fascist character of Heidegger's thinking. Now since the primary historicality was 'ontologically founded' on this basis, the automatic product of it was Heidegger's crucial distinction between 'authentic' and 'unauthentic' history. 'In keeping with the rooting of historicality in anxiety, existence exists as authentically historical or unauthentically historical, all depending.'¶ But according to Heidegger's reading of history, it was precisely real history that was unauthentic, just as real time is the 'vulgar' kind. In giving history an apparently ontologically reasoned basis, Heidegger actually took away any kind of historicality, whilst acknowledging as historical only a philistine's moral 'resolution'. In his analysis of everyday existence, Heidegger had already rejected all human orientation towards objective facts or trends in socio-economic life. There he stated:¶ One would completely mistake phenomenally what mood (Stimmung) reveals and how it does so, were one aiming at collating witih the revealed material that which existence, in the given 'mood', knows about and believes 'simultaneously'. Even if existence is 'secure' in the belief of its 'Whither', or thinks it is rationally enlightend about the Whence, none of this affects the established phenomenal fact that teh 'mood' confronts existence with the That of its There, a remorselessly sphinx-like sight. Existentially-ontologically, one has not the least right to suppress the 'evidence' of the existing state thorugh judging by the apodictic certainty of a theoretical perception of that which is purely present.¶ The illumination of existence can come only from within, for every (to Heidegger's mind: purported) objectively directed perception brings about a casting down (das Verfallen), a state of surrender to the 'one' and unauthenticity. Thus it was only logical for Heidegger, in positing the historicality of existence, to refute equally firmly everything objectively historical; Heidegger's historicality, then, has nothing to do with the point 'that existence occurs in a "world-history"'. Here he was polemicizing - quite rightly to some extent - against the old idealistic argumentation of the theory of history. The 'location of the historical problem', he said, 'must not be sought in history as a science of history ... How history may become a possible object of history (in the absract) can only be inferred from the ontological character of the historical,, from historicality and its rootedness in temporaneity.' Here again Heidegger was pre-empting the collapse of idealism, not unskillfully, by giving the impression that he planned to make the historical nature of existence itself the starting-point of history. But on one breath he was giving his existence itself, as we have observed, a thoroughly subjectivistic definition, while in the next he radically 'purged' the original historicality of existence of all relation to real, objective history. For: 'In accordance with the rooting of history in anxiety, existence existes as either authentically or unauthentically historical.' From this we may logically conclude that 'the authentic being-unto-death, i.e., the finiteness of temporaneity is the latent ground for the historicality of existence'.

#### Turns the aff - Calculation is a product of social institutions, like capitalism, not individual actions

Eldred 9 (Michael, Univ of Sydney, *Left Curve*, no 24, http://www.arte-fact.org/capiteen.html.)

Here, as everywhere else, Heidegger totalizes calculatingness without taking the economy into account, i.e. he consistently neglects what 'regulates' the 'regulating circuits' of capitalist economic activity, namely, the essentially contingent value-form. Because he did not learn anything essential from Marx, Heidegger characterizes present-day society not as capitalist society, but as "industrial society" (ibid.): "It is subjectivity relying entirely on itself. All objects are aligned towards this subject." (ibid.) In view of the Marxian analysis of the essence of commodity fetishism (which has to be thoroughly understood and should not be used erroneously, as in conventional left-wing cultural critique, as a code-word for the deranged tendency of modern humans to consume) which fathoms and presents the essential phenomenon of objects slipping out of the controlling hands of human subjects, no matter whether individual or collective, it must be concluded that Heidegger did not understand the Marxian alienation of essence of the subject in capitalism and thus missed the opportunity of thinking through modern technology in its essential sameness with capitalist economy.

#### A rejection of ontological boundaries reinforces capitalism – not only will the material basis of capital recreate entrenched attitudes, this rejection will destroy binaries such as class that are the only method of truly confronting material oppression

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

A broader point that needs to be made here is that, while for Heidegger the problem is the subject/object binary, and for posthumanists it is the human/animal distinction, what they all reject as metaphysical thinking is the logic of the "binary" which is the structuring principle of class society. Class societies, in which a few control the labor and products of others and thus have control over the lives of the majority, necessarily create cultural and conceptual divisions which codify these class relations. Conceptual divisions have their material roots not in the mind but in the world which the mind reflects, through more or less complex mediations. This is one of the basic principles of materialism: ideas are not the product of the (individual) mind; rather, social consciousness is shaped by social existence. Therefore changing how people think and thus act (whether to oneself, other humans, animals or the environment) requires changing the material divisions that produce othering. Philosophy which simply does away with conceptual distinctions in thinking, as Heidegger and other romantics do, not only gets rid of the very concepts (like "class," "exploitation," "determination") needed to understand the structuring principles of class society, but, in effect, displaces material change of objective conditions onto the subjective change of the individual. This is the essential politico-cognitive work that neoromantic theory does for capital. Whether through such concepts as Keats' "negative capability" Kant's "sublime," Heidegger's "Being" or "the question of the animal" that is the more recent focus of such writers as Derrida, Wolfe, and Calarco, romantic machine-thinking celebrates the dissolution of boundaries: between self and other, subject and object, philosophy and poetry, rich and poor, the social (as city) and nature. It constructs a post-rational linguistic realm of higher values which exceed restricting social codes and conventions. Boundaries, in romanticism, are viewed as the imposition of cultural codes and linguistic conventions that rigidly delineate, not as material (as effects of labor relations). It is through the replacement of "mechanical" concepts with speculative ones that romanticism blurs social boundaries and epistemological distinctions in an effort, not to transform capitalism, but to find a freer mode of thinking within it. As Wordsworth puts it in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads, it involves taking familiar incidents and "throw[ing] over them a certain colouring of imagination"—or, in the updated idiom of posthumanism, a "revolution in language and thought" (Calarco, Zoographies 6).¶ Heideggerian pre-reflective experience, like "the question of the animal," is in short the space in which "abstract" binaries like class (not to mention other social differences) evaporate. By blurring lines, romantic theory seeks, as Heidegger puts it, "the liberation of language from grammar" ("Letter on Humanism" 218), rather than social transformation. To liberate language from grammar is of course to free up thinking (from cultural bounds), to suspend the social structures of language and, according to Heidegger, to come closer to understanding Being. Grammarless language is thus the fantasy of the plentitude of meaning outside of the social. No matter how adamantly posthumanism condemns Heidegger's human-centered thinking, the very de-essentializing strategies it deploys to challenge human-animal distinctions are informed by the (Heideggerian) desire to escape existing social conventions, through the relay of the animal.

#### Heidegger’s focus on ready to hand thought as the root of inequality obsures the material basis of exploitation and renders impossible the material struggle necessary to overcome it

Tumino 12 (Stephen, “Animal Matters, Sublime Pets, and Other Posthumanist Stories”, Winter/Spring, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/printversions/animalmatterssublimepetsandotherposthumaniststoriesprint.htm)

Without an understanding of what makes the human and why (the mode of production) it is impossible to make a fundamental critique of the capitalist exploitation of human labor-power—the estranged labor that produces and "humanizes" wealth for the capitalist and impoverishes and "dehumanizes" the worker—and instead things appear topsy-turvy so that inequality appears to be the result of a "bad" consciousness—"instrumental reason" (Adorno); "ready-to-hand thought" (Heidegger); "the spirit of capitalism" (Weber); "carnophallogocentrism" (Derrida); "privatization of the commons" (Badiou, Negri, Žižek)—to be re-formed through more ethical discourses, or, in other words, through spiritual idealization ("learning to live well"). But this inversion of the material relations into ideology is itself an act of estranged labor inserted into the division of labor and represents the product of professional ideologists. In short, it is another instance of how labor power is exchanged for wages (means of consumption) rather than to meet human needs as a whole. Ethical discourses and "spiritual" fixes are commodified ways of individually learning to come to terms with the exploitation of labor by capital rather than a way to socially change the world for the good of all. ¶ It is the domination of capital that subjects labor to meeting physical needs (wages) and that makes culture into ideology, a reified activity to rationalize production and normalize the worker to her own subjection, rather than a material force for social emancipation from inequality. This is why although Marx argues that "the nature of the movement [the re-appropriation of estranged human life] initially depends on whether the actual and acknowledged life of the people has its being more in consciousness or in the external world, in ideal or real life" (Early Writings 345) he nevertheless maintains that the abolition of "real" estrangement (private property), as distinct from the negation of estranged "ideas" (reified thought), "embraces both aspects" (349) while the contrary is not the case. In other words, the Hegelian inversion of "substance" as "subject" which negates the estrangement of ideas from their material basis when they are considered self-caused (as forms of "thought") is itself an ideological false consciousness, what Marx calls an "occult critique" (Economic Manuscripts 130), precisely in the sense that it does not "embrace" the universal estrangement of labor under capitalism but only concerns itself with the alienated "labor of thought" (Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 145; Hegel, Phenomenology 90-1, 128). In the same way the deconstruction of the human/animal binary inscribed within what Derrida calls "carnophallogecentric thought" that is effected by "thinking (the passion) of the animal" as it surfaces bodily in all inscriptions of knowledge does not "embrace" the material as the estrangement of human species-being as a whole but only contests the "ideal" subjection of "thinking" and necessarily reifies the material as ahistorical "matter" (the body as a certain "experience of language"). In other words, Derrida simply rehearses how "thought" too is "other than itself" (Marx) but does not surface the social forces that explain why "an inhuman power rules over everything" (Economic Manuscripts 110). Without a materialist explanation, thinking remains alienated and blissfully at home with social inequality. The critique of "ideal" estrangement (ideological "thought") necessarily leaves intact the estrangement of human powers as alien powers embodied in capital which does not change due to changes in discourse and which "always exceed[s] the fate of signs" (Morton and Zavarzadeh 7).

#### Our alt is the only way to solve their root cause arguments – Heidegger’s sole focus of scientist thinking fails

Eldred 9 (Michael, Univ of Sydney, *Left Curve*, no 24, http://www.arte-fact.org/capiteen.html.)

Therefore it cannot be a matter of bedevilling productionist ways of thinking, which are our heritage, and Heidegger himself underscores often that he is not hostile to technology and what it offers. Rather, he is aghast at the totalizing of productionist ways of thinking which, especially as modern, scientific ways of thinking, arrogate to themselves the status of occupying the sole locus of truth, compared to which all else is merely poetic fantasy and other forms of cultural embellishment and entertainment. By following Heidegger's genealogy of Western thinking, starting with Aristotle's ontology of productive power, we can come to appreciate that in the bosom of this thinking nestles a will to power over change and movement of all kinds with the ultimate aim that, from the present, knowledge can govern the calling to presence from the future of what is foreseen and precalculated to come. But with his single-minded focus on the productionist, setting-up nature of Western thinking, Heidegger himself was blind to another phenomenon that drew the attention of Greek thinking and which plays a ubiquitous role throughout history: exchange. Exchange here can be taken in both the narrower sense of economic trade and intercourse, and the broadest sense of interchanges of all kinds that are the fabric of human social living, including conversation, greeting, complimenting, insulting, love-making, arguing, coming to blows, and so on.